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Abstract
This paper analyzes market structures where leaders have a ﬁrst mover advan-
tage and entry by the followers is endogenous. The strategy of the leaders is always
more aggressive than the strategy of the followers independently from strategic substi-
tutability or complementarity. Under quantity competition, the leader produces more
than any other ﬁrm and I determine the conditions for entry deterrence to be optimal
(high substitutability and constant or decreasing marginal costs). Under price compe-
tition, the leader sets a lower price than each follower, just the opposite than with an
exogenous number of ﬁrms. In contests the leader invests more than each follower. In
all these cases a leadership improves the allocation of resources compared to the Nash
equilibrium with endogenous entry.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies market structures where one or more ﬁrms have a ﬁrst mover
advantage in the sense of Stackelberg (1934) on the other ﬁrms, but entry in
the market is endogenous, characterizes their equilibrium and performs welfare
analysis for some of the applications. These market structures emerge in many
sectors which are substantially competitive (a fringe of ﬁr m si sr e a d yt oe n t e r
whenever there is a proﬁtable opportunity), but where some incumbent ﬁrms
have a competitive advantage over the followers (because of technological, his-
torical or legal reasons, or just because entry was not possible at an earlier
stage) and choose their strategies before them.1
While standard models of symmetric competition have been widely studied
in the presence of endogenous entry in a Marshallian tradition, traditional mod-
els with incumbent ﬁrms facing a competitive fringe of entrants have been mostly
limited to the analysis of markets with homogenous goods and entry deterrence,
for instance in the theories of limit pricing and of contestable markets (Baumol,
Panzar and Willig, 1982). More recently, Vives (1988) has analyzed games with
sequential entry of multiple ﬁrms, but without endogenizing the entry process
(see also Anderson and Engers, 1992, 1994). This paper is an attempt to pro-
vide a general characterization of Stackelberg equilibria with endogenous entry
of followers.
The analysis delivers a simple result: leaders facing endogenous entry are al-
ways aggressive compared to the followers, in the sense that they always produce
more under competition in quantities or they set lower prices under competition
in prices, while this is not necessarily the case when the number of ﬁr m si se x -
ogenous. With a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms the leader is mainly concerned about the
reactions of the other ﬁrms to its own choices, but these reactions are opposite
a c c o r d i n gt ow h e t h e rs t r a t e g i cs u b s t i t u t ability or complementarity holds. How-
ever, when entry is endogenous, the leader is mainly concerned about the eﬀect
of its own choices on the entry decision: an accomodating behaviour would be
ineﬀective because (the induced) entry would make it unproﬁtable, while an ag-
gressive behaviour limits entry and spreads a small mark up over a large market
share.
1As well known, the commitment of the leaders to a strategy may not be credible in the
long run. Nevertheless, such a commitment represents a credible advantage in markets with a
short horizon or when strategies are costly to change. For instance, in some seasonal markets
ﬁrms choose their production level at the beginning of the season and it is hard to change such
a strategic choice afterward. In other markets, prices are sticky in the short run because the
information to reoptimize is costly or because a price change can induce adverse reputational
eﬀects on the perception of the customers: being the ﬁrst mover in the price choice provides the
leader with a credible commitment in the short run. In patent races, a preliminary investment
in research and development represents a solid commitment to an innovation strategy.
2While I develop the main analysis in a general framework that nests a num-
ber of models, I also study in detail some of these models, starting from com-
petition in quantities. When goods are imperfect substitutes and the average
cost function is U-shaped market leaders facing endogenous entry produce more
than their followers but entry occurs in equilibrium. However, when goods
are homogenous and marginal costs are constant, the leader ﬁnds it optimal
to increase output until no one of the potential entrants can obtain proﬁts in
the market. Nevertheless, in both cases eﬀective or potential entry induce the
leader to choose an extremely low price, and welfare is higher compared to the
corresponding Cournot equilibrium with endogenous entry. In models with com-
petition in prices, the impact of endogenous entry is even more radical. While
leaders facing an exogenous number of followers choose a higher price than their
competitors, leaders facing endogenous entry always choose a lower price than
each other ﬁrm and obtain positive proﬁts (enjoying a ﬁrst mover advantage).
I analyze the cases of Logit and Dixit-Stiglitz demands and verify that welfare
is also higher under Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry: again, the
lower price of the leaders improves the allocation of resources. Finally, also
diﬀerent kinds of contests are nested in our general model. In these models
we have leaders facing endogenous entry that invest more than any other ﬁrm:
between the diﬀerent applications, I will focus on patent races, where it emerges
again that the allocation of resources is improved when one of the ﬁr m sa c t sa s
a leader and entry is endogenous.
The analysis of Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry is closely
related with three older theoretical frameworks. The ﬁrst is the literature
on entry deterrence associated with the socalled Bain-Modigliani-Sylos Labini
framework. The inital contributions by Bain (1956), Sylos Labini (1956) and
Modigliani (1958) took in consideration the eﬀects of entry on the behaviour
of market leaders, but they were not developed in a coherent game theoretic
framework and were substantially limited to the case of competition with per-
fectly substitute goods and constant or decreasing marginal costs (which not by
chance, as we will see, are suﬃcient conditions for entry deterrence).
The second is the dominant ﬁrm theory, which tries to explain the pricing
decision of a market leader facing a competitive fringe of ﬁrms taking as given
the price of the leader (see Viscusi et al., 2005, Ch. 6). Assuming that the
supply of this fringe is increasing in the price, the demand of the leader is
total market demand net of this supply. The proﬁt maximizing price of the
ﬁrm is above marginal cost but constrained by the competitive fringe. The
dominant ﬁrm theory provides interesting insights on the behaviour of market
leaders under competitive pressure, and this work tries to provide an alternative
game-theoretic foundation for its results.
The third is the theory of contestable markets by Baumol, Panzar and Willig
(1982), which is mostly focused on markets for homogenous goods without sunk
costs of entry, and it shows that the possibility of “hit and run” strategies by po-
tential entrants is compatible only with an equilibrium price equal to the average
3cost: in other words, a single potential entrant is enough to insure a competitive
behaviour of the incumbent. An interesting feature of this equilibrium is that
it corresponds to the one emerging under price competition where the incum-
bent sets its price before the entrants. In this paper I will try to examine more
general situations in which the goods are not necessarily homogenous, and the
incumbent leader and the followers can compete both in prices and quantities.
In such a case, only a potentially large set of competitors that guarantees that
entry can be regarded as endogenous induces a competitive behaviour of the
leader.
These results lead to a few policy implications. The general aggressive be-
haviour of the market leaders facing endogenous entry suggests that large mar-
ket shares and large extraproﬁts for these leaders can be the consequence of
a competitive behaviour induced by the competitive pressure of the entrants.
Therefore, in the ﬁeld of antitrust policy, and in particular in investigations
concerning abuse of dominance, a preliminary examination of the entry condi-
tions is crucial to verify whether large market shares of the leaders can be a
sympthom of dominance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model
and derives the main general results, Section 3-5 study in detail applications
to models of competition in quantities, prices and in contests, and develop a
welfare analysis for each application. Section 6 discusses some extensions and
Section 7 provides some policy implications. Section 8 concludes. Proofs and
further extensions are left in the Appendix.
2 The model
In this section I will introduce a general model of market structure and study
Stackelberg equilibria with and without endogenous entry.
Consider many identical ﬁrms which are potential entrants in a market.
Each ﬁrm i active in the market chooses a single strategic variable xi ∈ X ⊂ R+
w h e r et h ec l o s es e tX is a strategy space. If n ﬁrms enter in the market, a set
of strategies delivers the net proﬁt function for ﬁrm i:
πi = Π(xi,X −i) − K (1)
where the eﬀects or spillovers induced by the strategies of the other ﬁrms on ﬁrm
i’s proﬁts are summarized by X−i =
Pn
j=1,j6=i h(xj) for some function h : X →
R+ which is assumed continuous, diﬀerentiable, positive and increasing, and
K ≥ 0i saﬁxed cost of production. I assume that the function Π : X×R+ → R+
is twice diﬀerentiable and quasiconcave in xi with an optimal strategy x(X−i)
for any level of spillovers X−i, while spillovers are assumed to exert a negative
eﬀect on proﬁts, Π2 < 0, which, as we will see, is a necessary condition for
having free entry equilibria.2
2Subscripts denote derivatives. In order to focus on interesting issues I also assume that
4In general, it could be that Π12 is positive, so that we have strategic comple-
mentarity ( S C ) ,o rn e g a t i v es ot h a tw eh a v estrategic substitutability (SS). I will
deﬁne strategy xi as aggressive compared to strategy xj when xi >x j and as
accomodating when the opposite holds: notice that a more aggressive strategy
by one ﬁrm reduces the proﬁts of the other ﬁrms. Most of the commonly used
models of oligopolistic competition are nested in our general speciﬁcation: as
we will see, these include all symmetric models of competition in quantities,
models of competition in prices with Logit and Dixit-Stiglitz demand functions,
standard patent races, contests, rent seeking games, and others.
O n eo ft h eﬁr m si sal e a d e ri nt h es e n s et h a ti saﬁrst mover in the choice
of the strategy.3 The other ﬁrms are the followers and the entry of these is
endogenous. Since a generic zero proﬁt condition will determine the endogenous
number of ﬁrms, I will refer to the equilibrium as to a free entry equilibrium. In
particular, I will deﬁne a Stackelberg Equilibrium with Free Entry (SEFE) as a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with the following simple sequence of
moves:
1) in the ﬁrst stage, a leader, ﬁrm L,e n t e r s ,p a y st h eﬁxed cost F and
chooses its own strategy, say xL;
2) in the second stage, after knowing the strategy of the leader, all potential
entrants simultaneously decide “in” or “out”: if a ﬁrm decides “in”, it pays the
ﬁxed cost K;
3) in the third stage all the followers that have entered choose their own
strategy xi (hence, the followers play in Nash strategies between themselves).
In the last stage, the choice of each follower has to satisfy the ﬁrst order
condition:
Π1 (xi,X −i)=0 ( 2 )
where X−i =
P
j6=i h(xj)+h(xL). In this kind of games, given the number of
ﬁrms, a pure-strategy equilibrium exists if the reaction functions are continuous
or do not have downward jumps (see Vives, 1999). Unfortunately this may not
b et h ec a s ed u et ot h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁxed costs, but weak conditions for existence
have been studied for many applications.4 In this general framework I will
just assume existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium where all the followers
K ∈ (0,Π[x(χ),χ]) where χ = h(x(0)), which just means that if one ﬁrm is choosing the
monopolistic strategy (the optimal one given inactivity of the others), entry is proﬁtable: the
market is not a natural monopoly.
3The exogeneity of this leadership can be a realistic description for markets with established
dominant ﬁrms, or where entry at an earlier stage was not possible for technological or legal
reasons, for liberalized markets that were once considered natural monopolies or those where
intellectual property rights play an important role. Later I will extend the model to multiple
leaders and endogenous leadership. I am extremely thankful to a referee for pointing out this
issue.
4For instance, see Amir and Lambson (2000) on Cournot games with perfectly substitute
goods and Vives (1999) for a survey. In general, under SC there are only symmetric equilibria
but there may be more than one, while under SS there is a unique symmetric equilibrium but
there may be other asymmetric equilibria.
5c h o o s et h es a m es t r a t e g yxF (this happens in all our examples and, in general,
under a standard contraction condition, Π11 +( n − 2)h0(xF)|Π12| < 0).5
Therefore, I will simply focus on a particular symmetric equilibrium for the
second stage of the game. This will be characterized by the ﬁrst order condition:
Π1 [xF,(n − 2)h(xF)+h(xL)] = 0 (3)
where I used the fact that the spillovers perceived by any follower are X−F =
(n−2)h(xF)+h(xL). Subscripts F and L will denote the representative follower
and the leader in the symmetric equilibrium through all the paper.
2.1 Exogenous entry
When the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, the standard results on Stackelberg
duopolies easily generalize. Given the number of ﬁrms n, total diﬀerentia-
tion of (3) implies that the reaction functions of the followers have a slope
dxF/dxL ∝ Π12 (xF,X −F). Therefore, an increase in the strategy of the leader
xL makes the followers more aggressive under the assumption of SC (Π12 > 0)
and more accommodating under SS (Π12 < 0). Consequently, in case of an





2 Π12(n − 1)h0(xF)h0(xL)
Π11 +( n − 2)h0(xF)Π12
whose right hand side has the sign of ΠL
12 (xL,X −L). We then obtain the tradi-
tional result for which xL <x F under SC and xL >x F under SS: Stackelberg
competition with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms implies that the leader is aggressive
compared to each follower under SS and accommodating under SC.6 We now
turn to the case where the number of ﬁr m si se n d o g e n o u s . 7
2.2 Endogenous entry
Now, let us consider endogenous entry. I will now provide an intuitive and
constructive argument to characterize the SEFE which will be useful in the
5This always holds for n = 2. With more than one follower, weaker conditions for unique-
ness are available for particular models. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that whenever
asymmetric equilibria can emerge, as under quantity competition with strong increasing re-
turns (see Amir and Lambson, 2000), the predictive power of our selected equilibrium would
be diminished.
6The ambiguity of these results on the optimal behaviour of a leader is even deeper when
reaction functions are not monotonic, that is when SS holds in some regions and not in others.
7As usual in this literature I will simplify the analysis considering n as a real number
when larger than 2. A general treatment is more complex but the spirit of the result is
unchanged under regularity conditions. Anyway, as a referee noticed, the following analysis
can be interpreted as focusing on two extreme cases: one is a duopoly model in which entry
can possibly be deterred and the other is a model with one leader and many small ﬁrms in
which integer constraints can be ignored. In Etro (2007) I discuss how to derive the exact
equilibria taking the integer constraint on n into account.
6applications of the next section, leaving formal proofs to Appendix A.
Imagine that some followers enter in the market in equilibrium. Then, in
the last stage we still have the ﬁrst order equilibrium condition for the followers
(3). Under our assumptions, the proﬁts for the followers are decreasing in the
number of entrants,8 therefore in the second stage the followers enter in the
market until there are positive proﬁts to be made, and one can impose the free
entry condition:
Π[xF,(n − 2)h(xF)+h(xL)] = K (4)
The system (3)-(4) can be thought of as determining the behavior of the
followers in the second and third stages, namely as determining xF and n as
functions of the leader’s ﬁrst stage action. But we can also look at these two
equations in a diﬀerent way: they can be solved for the two unknowns (xF,X −F)
w h i c ho n l yd e p e n do nt h eﬁxed cost of production and not on the strategy of the
leader. Given (xF,X −F), there is a unique locus of (xL,n) pairs that satisfy
the equilibrium relation X−F =( n − 2)h(xF)+h(xL). In other words, the
strategy of the followers is independent from the strategy of the leader, while
their number must change with the latter.9
Let us now move to the ﬁrst stage and study the choice of the leader. As
long as entry takes place, the perceived spillovers of the leader can be written
as:
X−L =( n − 1)h(xF)=X−F + h(xF) − h(xL)( 5 )
which depends on xL only through the last term, since we have just seen that
the pair (xF,X −F) does not depend on xL. W ec a nu s et h i sr e s u l tt ov e r i f y
when entry of followers takes place or not. It is immediate that entry does not
occur for any strategy of the leader xL above a cut-oﬀ ¯ xL such that n =2o r ,
substituting in (5), such that:
X−F = h(¯ xL)( 6 )
which clearly implies ¯ xL ≥ xF. Entry occurs whenever xL < ¯ xL.I ns u c hac a s e ,
the leader chooses the optimal strategy to maximize:






Π11 +( n − 2)h0(xF)Π12
< 0
since Π2 < 0 and the denominator is negative under the stability assumption. In case proﬁts
have a positive limit for n increasing, a free entry equilibrium requires high enough ﬁxed costs.
9T h ei n v a r i a n c ep r o p e r t y( dxF/dxL =0 )i sq u i t ei m p o r t a n ts i n c ei ts h o w st h a tw h a t
matters for the leader is not the reaction of each single follower to its strategy, but the eﬀect
on entry. This is exactly the opposite of what happens in the Stackelberg equilibrium of the
previous section: when entry is exogenous the leader takes as given the number of followers
and looks at the reaction of their strategies to its own strategy; when entry is endogenous the
leader takes as given the strategies of the followers and looks at the reaction of their number
to its own strategy.
7which delivers the ﬁrst order condition:10
ΠL
1 [xL,(n − 1)h(xF)] = ΠL
2 [xL,(n − 1)h(xF)]h0(xL)( 8 )
In this case the equilibrium values for xL, xF and n a r eg i v e nb yt h es y s t e m
of three equations (3)-(4)-(8).
In general, the proﬁt function perceived by the leader is an inverted U re-
lation in xL for any strategy below the entry deterrence level ¯ xL,a n di tt a k e s
positive values just for xL >x F.B e y o n dt h ec u t - o ﬀ ¯ xL,i ti sd o w n w a r ds l o p i n g
(under the assumption that the market is not a natural monopoly). Conse-
quently, the entry deterring strategy is optimal only if it provides higher proﬁts
than the locally optimal strategy characterized by (8). If we are just interested
in the qualitative behaviour of the ﬁrms, we can conclude as follows:
Proposition 1. A SEFE always implies that the leader is aggressive
compared to each follower, and each follower either does not enter or
chooses the same strategy as under Nash competition with free entry.
Before turning to the applications of this result, we brieﬂy comment on
the comparative statics of the equilibrium. The impact of a generic parameter
aﬀecting the proﬁt functions is quite complicated and intuitions are hard to
grasp, but we can make some useful progress focusing on changes in the ﬁxed
cost. It turns out that the results are typically the opposite if SS or SC holds.
For simplicity, let us assume Π22 ≥ 0, which will hold in our examples.11 We
obtain:
Proposition 2. Consider a SEFE where entry of followers tUnder
strategic substitutability, a) if Π12h0(xF) > Π11, the strategy of each
ﬁrm is increasing and the number of ﬁrms is decreasing in K,b )o t h -
erwise, the strategy of entrants (leader) is increasing (decreasing) in





strategy of entrants and their number are decreasing while the strat-
egy of the leader is increasing in (independent from) K,d )o t h e r w i s e ,
the strategy of each ﬁrm is decreasing in K.
We will now verify these results in models of quantity and price competition
and in contests and we will also discuss the welfare implications of the speciﬁc
applications.






that I assume to be satisﬁed at the interior optimum.
11Π22 > 0 in the case of quantity competition and perfectly substitute goods as long as
demand is convex, in our examples of price competition and in standard patent races.
83 Competition in quantities
In this section I apply the general results on the SEFE to models of competition
in quantities. Let us consider a market where each ﬁrm i chooses the output xi
and faces an inverse demand pi = p(xi,X −i) which is decreasing in both argu-
ments. This implies that goods are substitutes, but not necessarily homogenous
- of course, in case of homogenous goods the inverse demand could be written as
p = p(X) for all ﬁrms, with X total output. If the cost function is an increasing
function c(xi), the proﬁtf o rﬁrm i is:
πi = xip(xi,X −i) − c(xi) − K (9)
with X−i =
Pn
j6=i h(xj), p1 < 0a n dp2 < 0. We can verify that the associ-
ated proﬁt function is nested in our general form (1) under simple regularity
conditions.
To characterize the SEFE, let us start by looking at the last stages. Assume
ﬁrst that the output of the leader is low enough that entry occurs in equilibrium
(we will verify later on when this is the case). The equilibrium ﬁrst order
condition for the followers and the endogenous entry condition are:
p(xF,X −F)+xFp1(xF,X −F)=c0(xF)
xFp(xF,X −F)=c(xF)+K
and they pin down the production of the followers xF and their spillovers X−F
independently from the production of the leader. Consequently, the proﬁts of
the leader can be rewritten as:
πL = xLp(xL,X −L) − c(xL) − K
= xLp[xL,X −F + h(xF) − h(xL)] − c(xL) − K
whose maximization delivers the optimality condition:
p(xL,X −L)+xL [p1(xL,X −L) − p2(xL,X −L)h0(xL)] = c0(xL) (10)
Comparing the equilibrium optimality conditions of the leader and the followers,
and using the fact that goods are substitutes (p2 < 0), it follows that the leader
produces more than each follower. For these conditions to characterize the
equilibrium it must be that the alternative strategy of entry deterrence provides
lower proﬁts to the leader. As intuitive, this happens when marginal costs are
strongly increasing in the output or there is little substitutability between goods.
In particular, when goods are homogenous, the inverse demand is simply
p(X), and the cost function is convex, the equilibrium condition for the leader
boils down to an equation between the price and its marginal cost. In such a
case, the equilibrium is fully characterized by the following conditions:
p(X)=
c0(x)





9where the ﬁrst equality is a traditional mark up rule for the followers (with  
elasticity of demand), the second equality is the endogenous entry condition,
a n dt h et h i r do n ed e ﬁnes the pricing rule of the leader. Notice that while
t h ef o l l o w e r sp r o d u c eb e l o wt h eo p t i m a ls c a l e( d e ﬁned by the equality between
marginal and average cost), the leader produces above this scale and obtains
positive proﬁts thanks to the increasing marginal costs.
We now provide two simple examples of SEFE in models of competition in
quantities where entry occurs.
Example 1: U-shaped cost function Consider homogenous goods and
linear demand p = a − X for all ﬁrms, where X =
Pn
j=1 xj is total output.
Imagine that the average cost function is U-shaped, and in particular that the
cost function is quadratic. Hence, the proﬁtf u n c t i o nf o rﬁrm i is:





Consider the last stage. Given the production of the leader xL, the equilibrium
output for the entrants is xF =( a−xL)/(n+d), and the associated proﬁts are
ΠF =( 2+d)(a − xL)2/2(n + d)2. Under free entry, the zero proﬁt condition
delivers the number of ﬁrms n =( a − xL)
p







Hence total production is X = a − (1 + d)
p
2K/(2 + d), which is independent
from the leader’s production. The gross proﬁt function of the leader in the ﬁrst
stage, as long as there is entry, that is for n>2o rxL <a−
p
2K(2 + d), is:

















Accordingly, the output of the leader is always higher than the output of the
followers. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is n = a
p
(2 + d)/2K −1/d−d+1.
This number is larger than two when d is positive and large enough, the size of
the market (a) is large enough (or the ﬁxed costs are small enough); if this is
not the case we have an equilibrium with entry deterrence. Notice that under
Cournot competition with free entry each ﬁrm would produce the same as xF
derived above, and also total production would be the same, but the number
of ﬁrms would be larger by 1/d. For instance, if d = 1 Stackelberg competition
10eliminates one entrant and replaces its production with the leader producing
the double than any other ﬁrm.
Since we know from Mankiw and Whinston (1986) that the Cournot equilib-
rium with free entry is characterized by too many ﬁrms producing too little, it
is intuitive that Stackelberg competition with free entry improves the allocation
of resources inducing a reduction in the number of ﬁrms. This result holds for
any demand function as long as goods are homogenous, since our model implies
always that total production is the same under Stackelberg and Cournot com-
petition when entry is free, but a leader produces more than the followers and
there are less ﬁrms in the Stackelberg case. Hence, the associated reduction in
wasted ﬁxed costs comes back in form of proﬁts for the leader, which increases
welfare. In conclusion, consumer surplus is the same, but welfare is higher under
Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry:
Proposition 3. Consider quantity competition with homogenous
goods. Under endogenous entry, as long as there is entry of some
followers, Stackelberg competition in quantities is always Pareto su-
perior with respect to Cournot competition.
Example 2: Product diﬀerentiation The second example is a linear model
with product diﬀerentiation, where inverse demand is now pi = a − xi − biX−i
with b ∈ (0,1),12 and c is the constant marginal cost. Proﬁts for ﬁrm i are now
given by:
Π(xi,X −i)=xi (a − xi − bX−i) − cxi (15)
Under Stackelberg competition, as long as substitutability between goods is
limited enough (b is small) there are entrants producing xF =( a−bxL−c)/[2+




when we endogenize the number of ﬁrms under free entry. The proﬁtf u n c t i o n





K − (1 − b)xL
i


























where Ci is consumption of good i and C0 is the numeraire.
11Again, the production of the leader is higher than the production of the followers.
Moreover, the leader will oﬀer its good at a lower price than the followers,
namely:






K<p F = c +
√
K (18)
The consequence is that entry of followers is reduced. Since consumers value
product diﬀerentiation in such a model the welfare consequences are complex.
Nevertheless, one can verify that the reduction in the price of the leader more
than compensates the reduction in the number of varieties, and consumer sur-
plus is strictly increased by the leadership.13 Therefore, in this case the con-
sumers strictly gain from the aggressive pricing strategy of the leader even if
this induces some ﬁrms to exit and reduces the number of varieties provided in
the market.
These examples have shown cases in which entry occurs, and shows that
the leader is always more aggressive than each follower. Notice that in both
examples the comparative statics with respect of the ﬁxed cost was following
case a) of Prop. 2.
Let us now move to the equilibria where entry deterrence takes place. When
goods are homogenous or highly substitute, or when the marginal cost is de-
creasing, constant or not too much increasing, the optimality for the leader
implies a corner solution with entry deterrence. In our general formulation this
requires:
xFp(xF, ¯ xL)=c(xF)+K ⇐⇒ ¯ xL = X−F − xF (19)
Notice that the entry deterring output must be decreasing in the ﬁxed cost,
since this cost helps the leader to exclude the rivals, and it must approach the
average variable cost when the ﬁxed cost (of entry for the followers) tends to
zero.
In the case of general demand functions for homogenous goods, we can ac-
tually ﬁnd a simple suﬃcient condition for entry-deterrence which just depends
on the shape of the cost function:
13Using the quadratic utility that generates this demand function, in equilibrium we have:
















where Y is the exogenous income of the representative agent.The gain in consumer surplus





and the gain in welfare is ∆W = ∆U +πL. I am thankful to Nisvan Erkal and Daniel Piccinin
for insightful discussions on this point.
12Proposition 4. Consider quantity competition with homogenous
goods. Whenever marginal costs of production are constant or de-
creasing, Stackelberg competition in quantities with endogenous en-
try always delivers entry-deterrence with only the leader in the mar-
ket.
To verify this result, I will provide another example.
Example 3: Linear demand and constant marginal costs Consider the
simplest model of quantity competition, with linear demand p = a − X,w h i c h
derives from a quadratic utility, and constant marginal costs c. The proﬁts of a
generic ﬁrm i are given by:
Π(xi,X −i)=xi (a − xi − X−i) − cxi (20)
In this case, already mentioned in Etro (2006a), the SEFE is characterized by
entry deterrence with the leader producing:
¯ xL = a − c − 2
√
K (21)
and obtaining positive proﬁts. The limit price in this SEFE p = c+2
√
K is above
the equilibrium price under Cournot competition with free entry. Nevertheless,
welfare is higher because the proﬁts of the leader (associated with the savings in
ﬁxed costs) are enough to compensate for the lower consumer surplus (associated
with the lower production).14
Notice that this limit price is above the one emerging in case of Stackelberg
competition in prices, which would lead to a price equating average cost as in
the theory of contestable markets.15 In both cases, the price converges to the
marginal cost when ﬁxed costs disappear.
4 Competition in prices
The role of price leadership is often underestimated for two main reasons. The
ﬁrst is that commitments to prices are hardly credible when it is easy and
14Indeed, adopting the standard deﬁnition of welfare, in the Cournot equilibrium with free
entry this is:
WC =












It can be veriﬁed that welfare is higher in the Stackelberg case for any K<4(a − c)2/49,
which always holds when the market is not a natural monopoly, that is for K<(a − c)2/16.
15While we conﬁned the analysis of SEFE to well-behaved proﬁt functions, the general
concept applies also to the case of price competition with a leader and free entry. In such a
case the equilibrium requires a limit pricing by the incumbent satisfying p = a−x = c+F/x,
and corresponds to the equilibrium of the contestable market theory. In this sense, our SEFE
generalizes that theory.
13relatively inexpensive to change prices. While this is true for long term com-
mitments, it is also true that short term commitments can be credible in most
markets. In particular, when a price change requires substantial information
whose acquisition is costly and when it can exert adverse reputational eﬀects on
the perception of the customers, a commitment to a ﬁxed price can be reason-
able. Moreover, when a price change induces quick entry into the market or exit
from it, a commitment to a ﬁxed price may have a stronger rationale: while this
is inconsistent with a situation in which the number of ﬁr m si se x o g e n o u s ,t h e
price commitment becomes a relevant option exactly when entry in the market
is endogenous.
T h es e c o n dr e a s o nf o rw h i c hap r i c el e a d e r s h i pm a yp o o r l yd e s c r i b et h e
behaviour of market leaders is probably more pervasive and it relies on the
absence of a ﬁrst mover advantage in simple models of competition in prices.
For instance, in standard duopolies, a price leader obtains less proﬁts than its
follower, and for this reason neither one or the other ﬁrm would like to be
leaders: there is actually a second mover advantage. As we will see, this result
disappears and the ﬁrst mover advantage is back exactly when entry in the
market is endogenous.
I will focus on a large class of models of price competition with imperfect









with D1 < 0, D2 < 0, g(p) > 0a n dg0(p) < 0, which implies that demand of good
i decreases in pi and increases in any pj with j 6= i. For consistency with our
deﬁnitions, let us deﬁne the strategic variable as xi =1 /pi,a n dh(x)=g(1/x).
Then, assuming for simplicity a constant marginal cost c,w ec a nw r i t ep r o ﬁts
as:























j6=i h(xj). Clearly, also this model is nested in our
general formulation (1) under simple regularity conditions. While the direction
of the strategic eﬀect is not obvious, SC holds in most models of competition in
prices: this implies that leaders facing exogenous entry tend to be accomodating
setting higher prices than their followers.
Before analyzing the SEFE of this model, we present a few examples of well
known demand functions that belong to the class deﬁned above. A ﬁrst example





14with N>0a n dλ>0. This demand belongs to our class of demand func-
tions after setting g(p)=e x p ( −λp), which satisﬁes g0(p) < 0. Anderson et al.
(1992) have shown that this demand is consistent with a representative agent
maximizing the utility:














j=1 Cj = N and −∞ otherwise (total consumption for the n goods
is exogenous), under the budget constraint C0 +
Pn
j=1 pjCj = Y ,w i t hC0 as
the numeraire. This interpretation allows to think of 1/λ as a measure of the
variety-seeking behavior of the representative consumer.
Other important cases derive from the class of demand functions introduced
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and derived from the maximization of a utility func-










j=1 pjCj = Y ,w h e r eC0 is the numeraire, u(·) is quasilinear
or homothetic, V (·) is increasing and concave, and θ ∈ (0,1] parametrizes the














with θ ∈ (0,1) and α>0. In this case the constant elasticity of substitution
between goods is 1/(1−θ) and increases in θ. Demand for each good i =1 ,...,n














which belongs to our general class after setting g(p)=p
− θ
1−θ,t h a to fc o u r s e
satisﬁes g0(p) < 0. Similar demand functions and related models of price com-
petition have been widely employed in many ﬁelds where imperfect competition
plays a crucial role, including the new trade theory, the newkeynesian macro-
economics, the new open macroeconomy and the endogenous growth theory.
Let us move now to the characterization of the SEFE in the general case and
in these examples. To focus on the most interesting situations, I will assume
that product diﬀerentiation is such that entry deterrence is never desirable for
the leader. Denoting with pF and pL the prices of the followers and the leader,
the optimality condition for the followers and the endogenous entry condition
are:
D(pF,X −F)+( pF − c)D1 (pF,X −F)=0
(pF − c)D(pF,X −F)=K
15and they pin down the price of the followers pF and their spillovers XF =
(n − 1)g(pF), so that the proﬁt of the leader becomes:
πL =( pL − c)D[pL,(n − 1)g(pF) − g(pL)] − K =
=( pL − c)D[pL,X −F + g(pF) − g(pL)] − K
Proﬁt maximization delivers the equilibrium condition:
D(pL,X −L)+( pL − c)[D1(pL,X −L) − D2(pL,X −L)g0(pL)] = 0 (27)
which implies a lower price pL than the price of the followers, since the last
term on the left hand side is now negative. This is a crucial result by itself since
we are quite use to associate price competition with accommodating leaders
setting higher prices than the followers: this standard outcome collapses under
endogenous entry. Moreover, the leader is now obtaining positive proﬁts, while
each follower does not gain any proﬁts: the ﬁrst mover advantage is back.
Example 4: Logit demand Consider the Logit demand (23). Using our












j6=i e−λ/xj. Let us characterize the SEFE. First of all, as usual,
let us look at the stage in which the leader as already chosen its price pL and
the followers enter and choose their prices. Their ﬁrst order condition can be
written as:
pi = c +
1
λ(1 − Di/N)
where the demand on the right hand side depends on the price of the leader and
all the other prices as well. However, under free entry we must have also that
t h em a r k u po ft h ef o l l o w e r se x a c t l yc o v e r st h eﬁxed cost of production, hence
Di(pi−c)=K. If the price of the leader is not too low or the ﬁxed cost not too
high, there is indeed entry in equilibrium and we can solve these two equations
for the demand of the followers and their prices in symmetric equilibrium:










Notice that they do not depend on the price chosen by the leader. The proﬁts
perceived by the leader are now:
πL =( pL − c)DL − K =
(pL − c)e−λpLDF
e−λpF − K
16where we could use our previous results to substitute for pF and DF. Finally,
proﬁt maximization by the leader provides its equilibrium price:




which is lower than the price of each follower and independent from the ﬁxed
cost (Prop 2.c applies). Moreover, using the microfoundation pointed out by
Anderson et al. (1992) in terms of the quasilinear utility (24), one can show
that this equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient compared to the correspondent Bertrand
equilibrium with free entry: the reduction in the price of the leader reduces
entry, leaves unchanged consumer surplus and increases ﬁrms’ proﬁts, inducing
an increase in total welfare (see the Appendix).
Example 5: Dixit-Stiglitz demand I nt h ec a s eo ft h ei s o e l a s t i cd e m a n d
(26) derived above from the utility function (25), using our transformation of































θ[Y − K(1 + α)]
(32)
where of course the leader applies a lower mark up than each follower. Notice
that again the price of the followers increases in the ﬁxed cost, while the price
of the leader is independent (Prop 2.c applies). It can be veriﬁed that in any
version of the Dixit-Stiglitz model where 1/(1 − θ) is the constant elasticity of
substitution between goods and c is the marginal cost of production, as long as
entry is endogenous, the leader will choose the price pL = c/θ and the followers
will choose a higher price. Indeed, free entry pins down the price index that is
perceived by the leader, whose optimization problem is of the following kind:




which always delivers the price above. As a consequence, the leader produces
more than each follower and the number of followers is reduced compared to the
exact Dixit-Stiglitz equilibrium with free entry. Once again, however, consumer
surplus is not changed because the price index is unaﬀected. Since the leader
obtains positive proﬁts, welfare is increased overall (see the Appendix).
We can summarize the results obtained from these two examples as follows:
17Proposition 5. In a model of price competition with Logit demand
or Dixit-Stiglitz demand and endogenous entry, a leader sells its vari-
ety at a lower price than the entrants, inducing a Pareto improvement
in the allocation of resources.
In all these models we can verify the existence of an unambiguous ranking
of market structures from a welfare point of view. Indeed, from the best to the
worst case for welfare we have: 1) free entry with a leader; 2) free entry without
a leader; 3) barriers to entry without a leader; 4) barriers to entry with a leader.
5C o n t e s t s
Another application of our model concerns contests where ﬁrms compete to
obtain a prize: for instance this could be a patent on new technologies in a
patent race, a prize in a principal-agent model, or a generic rent in a rent
seeking contest. There are many ways to model such a situation, but here I
will focus on the patent race introduced by Loury (1979) where ﬁrms choose an
up-front investment xi to obtain an innovation according to a Poisson process.
Technically, this is a patent race in the continuum with arrival rates of innovation
given by functions h(x)w i t hh(0) = 0, h0(x) > 0a n dh00(x) ≷ 0f o rx ≶ ˆ x for
some ˆ x>0. Hence, given the interest rate r a n dt h ev a l u eo ft h ep a t e n tV ,t h e




− xi − K (33)
which is again a particular case of our general model and implies SS (at the
turning point).
Imagine that one ﬁrm has a ﬁrst mover advantage and invests before the
other ﬁrms in R&D.16 In such a case, the ﬁrst order conditions and the free
entry condition for the followers imply a symmetric equilibrium between them






V − xF − K
¶
(34)
Let us focus on the case where entry takes place in equilibrium. Using the free




− xL − F =
h(xL)(xF + K)
h(xF)
− (xL + K)





16Notice that there is not a time-inconsistency issue here, since after the investment is made,
there cannot be a chance to change it. See Etro (2004, 2008) for discussions.
18deﬁnes an interior maximum when h00(xL) < 0: it follows that the investment
of the leader is higher than the investment of the followers. If we imagine that
the innovation as also a positive value, we can analyze the equilibrium from a
welfare point of view. Since the aggregate probability of innovation is unchanged
by the presence of a leader, but the number of ﬁrms and total R&D investment
are reduced, welfare must improve, as formalized below:
Proposition 6. A ﬁrst mover ﬁrm in a contest with endogenous
entry invests more than any other ﬁrm and creates a Pareto improve-
ment in the allocation of resources compared to Nash competition.
Also in this case entry deterrence may occur when the marginal productivity
of the investment has a lower bound (for instance when h(x) is linear).
6E x t e n s i o n s
The results of the previous sections can be extended in many directions to be
able to describe market structures in a more realistic way. This section will
consider a few: introducing a technological asymmetry between the leader and
the followers, extending the model to multiple leaders and endogenizing the
same leadership status (Appendix B and C discuss further extensions, allowing
for multiple strategies and introducing simple forms of heterogeneities).
6.1 Asymmetries between leader and followers
Weaker forms of our basic result, the general aggressive behaviour of leaders fac-
ing free entry, emerge even when we introduce technological diﬀerences between
ﬁrms. Here I will focus on a simple exogenous asymmetry between the leader
and the followers to verify under which conditions the leader is still aggressive.
I assume that the leader has the proﬁt function:
πL = ΠL (xL,X −L,y) − K
where y>0 is a new parameter speciﬁc to the leader. The basic assumptions
are ΠL
3 ≡ ∂ΠL/∂y > 0a n dΠL (x,X,0) = Πi (x,X). A ﬁrst mover advantage is
often associated with some asymmetry between the leader and the followers. For
instance, it is natural to link the ﬁrst mover advantage with some technological
or market advantage, as a lower marginal cost c(y)w i t hc0(y) < 0. In general,
under asymmetry we obtain a strategy of the leader which depends on y, xL =
xL(y), and therefore the number of entrants, but not their individual strategy,
also depends on y.O n ec a ns h o w :





2) or y is small enough.
19The intuition is the following: an increase in the advantage of the leader
(that is in y) induces a higher incentive to aggressiveness if it raises the marginal
beneﬁt from it more than the change in its marginal cost. Indeed the suﬃcient
condition could be rewritten as ∂(ΠL
1 /ΠL
2)/∂y ≤ 0, that is the marginal rate of
substitution between xL and X−L should be decreasing in y. If this condition
does not hold, it means that x0
L(y) < 0, hence for a great enough y (a strong
enough asymmetry) the leader will be accommodating (xL(y) <x F).
To exemplify how one can apply this result, notice that the leader with a
lower marginal cost than its followers will always be aggressive because under
competition in quantities we have ΠL
13 > 0a n dΠL
23 = 0, and under competition
in prices we have ΠL
13 > 0a n dΠL
23 = −D2 (pL,X −L)c0(y) < 0. Similarly one
can examine other kinds of exogenous asymmetries (on the demand side, in
the ﬁnancial structure, in complementary markets, and so on) and verify how
the incentives of the leader to be aggressive are changed. Another application
was developed in Etro (2004) where I extended patent races similar to those of
Section 5 to the case in which the incumbent monopolist has a ﬂow of current
proﬁts: while under Nash competition and free entry this incumbent would not
participate to the race, when the same incumbent has the leadership in the
contest, its investment is higher than that of any other ﬁrm.17 One can verify
that we are in the case in which the asymmetry does not aﬀect the strategy of
the leader.18
6.2 Multiple leaders
Until now we considered a simple game with just one leader playing in the ﬁrst
stage. Here we will consider the case in which multiple leaders play simultane-
ously in the ﬁrst stage. Hence the timing of the game becomes the following:
1) in the ﬁrst stage, m leaders simultaneously choose their own strategies; 2) in
the second stage, potential entrants decide whether to enter or not; 3) in the
third stage each one of the n−m followers that entered chooses its own strategy.
Later on we will discuss how to endogenize m.
We should consider two diﬀerent situations: one in which entry of followers
is not deterred in equilibrium and one in which the leaders deter entry. Consider
ﬁrst the case in which the number of leaders m is small enough, or the cost of
deterrence is large enough that entry of followers takes place in equilibrium. In
17Many real world innovations are obtained by dominant ﬁrms, especially in high-tech
sectors and pharmaceutical sectors, where leading companies (like Microsoft, Intel, Pﬁzer
or Merck) feature the highest R&D-turnover ratios. See Segerstrom (2007) for a related
discussion.
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2 )=−h0(xL)/[r + h(xL)+X−L]2 < 0.
20such a case, the behaviour of the leaders can be characterized in a similar fashion
to our basic analysis. Moreover, contrary to what happens when the number of
ﬁrms n in the market is exogenous (when the number of leaders m aﬀects their
strategic interaction, their strategies and their proﬁts), with endogenous entry,
the number of leaders does not aﬀect their strategies and their proﬁts:
Proposition 8. In a SEFE with m leaders, as long as there is en-
dogenous entry of some followers, each leader is aggressive compared
to each follower and its strategy and proﬁts are independent from m.
This conﬁrms the spirit of our results with a single leader. Now each one of
the leaders behaves in an aggressive way compared to the followers and also in-
dependently from the other leaders: even the proﬁt of each leader is not aﬀected
by the number of leaders, while the number of entrants is clearly decreased by
an increase in the number of leaders.
The situation is more complicated if there is entry deterrence in equilibrium.
In the case of an exogenous number of ﬁrms entry deterrence is a sort of pub-
lic good for the leaders, which introduces free-riding issues in their behavior.
Gilbert and Vives (1986) have analyzed this issue in a model with m leaders
facing a potential entrant, while Tesoriere (2006) has extended our model to
analyze m leaders facing endogenous entry in a linear model of competition in
quantities: while multiple equilibria can emerge, total output is equal or larger
than the entry deterrent output in all of them.
6.3 Endogenous leadership
After developing a Stackelberg model with multiple leaders and endogenous
entry of followers, it is natural to question what happens when the entry of
leaders is endogenous as well.
The simplest way to endogenize the number of leaders is by adding an initial
stage of the game where ﬁrms decide simultaneosly whether to become a leader
or not. Any ﬁrm can make an investment, say L, which provides the status
of leader in the market, while any ﬁrm that does not invest can only enter in
the market as a follower: in other words, commitment to strategies is costly.
As Prop. 8 suggests, as long as there is entry of followers, it must be that all
leaders obtain the same level of positive proﬁts (which is independent from the
number of leaders m). Hence, if the investment needed to become leader is small
enough, there must be always incentives to invest to become leaders when this
does not deter entry of followers. Then, consider the largest number of leaders
compatible with some entry, say M<n . Given this number of leaders, another
ﬁrm may invest in leadership and subsequently engage in Nash competition
with the other leaders only (entry of followers is now deterred by construction).
If such an entry is proﬁtable, the equilibrium must imply only leaders in the
market and an endogenous number m∗ >Mderived from a free entry condition
with a ﬁxed cost K + L (clearly this happens whenever the cost of leadership
21is zero or small enough). If this is not the case, the only equilibrium implies
m∗ = M ﬁrms investing in leadership and a residual competitive fringe of n−M
followers: once again, as Prop. 8 still implies, all leaders would be aggressive
compared to each follower.
Another interesting situation emerges when entry is sequential, so that there
is a hierarchical leadership. While a general treatment of sequential games
is complex, Vives (1988) and Anderson and Engers (1992, 1994) have fully
characterized sequential competition in quantities with linear costs and isoelastic
demand, and with an exogenous number of ﬁrms. Their analysis makes clear
that in case of endogenous entry the only possible equilibrium would imply
entry deterrence, a result conﬁrmed by the analysis developed more recently by
Tesoriere (2006).
7 Policy implications
The endogenous entry approach is based on the idea that entry in a market is
a rational decision based on the proﬁtable opportunities that are available in a
market. In this paper I adopted this approach to study the behaviour of market
leaders in the choice of their strategies, but the same approach can be used
to study preliminary strategic commitments by market leaders,19 horizontal
mergers20 a n de v e nc a r t e l s 21 in markets where entry is endogenous. For this
reason, this approach could be fruitful to examine policy issues in markets where
entry is relatively easy, fast and sensible to the proﬁtable opportunities, and it
can be regarded as endogenous at least in the medium term.
The main ﬁeld of application is antitrust policy. The study of strategic inter-
actions in markets with endogenous entry may allow to build a bridge between
the two main approaches to antitrust: on one side the Chicago school, that has
focused its informal analysis on the role of free entry in constraining incumbent
ﬁrms, but has largely neglected the role of strategic interactions between ﬁrms
(see Posner, 2001), and on the other side the post-Chicago approach, that has
focused on the strategic interactions between incumbents and entrants mostly
without emphasizing the role of endogeneity of the market structure (for a sur-
vey see Motta, 2004).
The analysis of the behaviour of leaders in markets where entry is endogenous
is potentially relevant for the ﬁeld of antitrust analysis which concerns abuse of
dominance (or monopolisation). In particular, it allows to re-examine the same
concepts of market power and dominance, which are too often automatically
associated with a large market share of the leading ﬁrm. Our analysis has
shown that leaders tend to be aggressive, or more aggressive compared to their
19See Etro (2006) and Etro (2007, Ch. 2) on predatory pricing, bundling, price discrimina-
tion, vertical restraints and other commitments that are relevant for antitrust purposes.
20See Davisdon and Mukherjee (2007), Erkal and Piccinin (2007) and Etro (2007, Ch. 2).
21See Etro (2007, Ch. 3).
22followers, exactly when entry is endogenous: in such a case, aggressive strategies
are associated with large market shares and positive proﬁts for the leaders, but
also with low prices constrained by the behaviour of the followers.
In the basic model with homogenous goods, U-shaped cost functions and
competition in quantities, the equilibrium price equates the marginal cost of
the entrants augmented with a mark up depending on the elasticity of demand,
and it also equates their average cost of production, because entry exhausts all
the proﬁt opportunities. At the same time, the leader produces to equate its
marginal cost to the price level: since the followers produce below the eﬃcient
scale of production and the leader above it, the leader manages to obtain a larger
market share and positive proﬁts. When we introduce product diﬀerentiation,
the leader keeps producing more than the other ﬁrms and also sells its product
at a lower price, under both competition in quantities and in prices. Similar
results emerge when competition is for the market, through investments in R&D
to obtain new products. In such a case, leaders invest more than the other
ﬁrms when entry in this competition is endogenous. Consequently, in case of
sequential innovations the same persisten c eo ft h el e a d e r s h i pc a nb ea s s o c i a t e d
with high contestability rather than with persistent market power.22
Our welfare analysis of markets with endogenous entry has emphasized that,
i na l lt h e s ec a s e s ,t h ep r e s e n c eo fal e a d er induces an increase in welfare calcu-
lated as the sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts. Moreover, when entry is not
entirely deterred, consumer surplus is either increased or left unchanged by the
presence of a leader. Therefore, entry has a crucial role in disciplining the be-
haviour of market leaders. Finally, when entry can be regarded as endogenous,
for instance when we are mainly concerned about the medium-long run and
entry is feasible in this horizon, a large market share of the leader should not be
a symptom of market power, but of an aggressive strategy induced by the com-
petitive pressure of the entrants. Therefore, in the ﬁeld of antitrust policy, and
in particular in investigations concerning abuse of dominance, a preliminary
examination of the entry conditions is crucial to verify whether large market
shares of the leaders can be a symptom of dominance or just of competitive
pressure on the leaders.
Another ﬁeld of application of the endogenous entry approach concerns trade
policy for exporting ﬁrms. As well known from the theory of strategic trade
policy, a government may tax or subsidize domestic ﬁrms that are active in in-
ternational markets for proﬁt shifting reasons: such a policy allows to turn the
domestic ﬁrm into a Stackelberg leader, and to increase the net proﬁts for the
country. For instance, when a domestic ﬁrm competes against a foreign com-
petitor in a third market, it is typically optimal to tax exports under strategic
complementarity and to subsidize exports under strategic substitutability: the
22In Etro (2007) I applied these arguments to the software market, arguing that the en-
dogeneity of entry in the competition in the market justiﬁes the aggressive pricing policy,
the large market share and the extra proﬁts of its leader, and the endogenity of entry in the
competition for the market justiﬁes the persistence of its leadership.
23reason is that the Stackelberg leader is accommodating in the former case and
aggressive in the latter. When entry in the international market is endogenous,
the same principle applies, but it is always optimal to subsidize exports, since
this induces the desired aggressive behaviour. In conclusion, the ambiguity of
the policy implications emerging with an exogenous number of ﬁr m si ss o l v e d
when entry in international markets is regarded as endogenous, and the optimal
unilateral policy is always an export subsidy.23
8C o n c l u s i o n
This article examined the behaviour of ﬁrms with a ﬁrst mover advantage over
their competitors in the choice of the market strategy. A general result emerg-
ing in the presence of endogenous entry is that leaders tend to behave in an
aggressive way, in particular they choose lower prices and higher output than
their followers. The study of the eﬀects of endogenous entry on the behaviour
of the ﬁrms, on their commitments to adopt diﬀerent strategies and the analysis
of the eﬀects of these strategies on consumers could be fruitfully investigated
in the future. Finally, it would be interesting to verify some of the results ob-
tained above and in the related literature on endogenous entry in empirical or
experimental analysis.
23The optimal export subdisy reproduces the Stackelberg equilibrium with endogenous entry
where the domestic ﬁrm acts as a leader (see Etro, 2007, Ch.3). The same principle applies
to international R&D contests: in such a case, it is always optimal to subsidize R&D when
entry is endogenous (Etro, 2008).
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P r o o fo fP r o p1 : The system (3)-(4) deﬁnes the impact on xF and n of





















where ∆ = Π11Π2h(xF) and Π11 +( n − 2)Π12h0(xF)+Π2h(xF) < 0 (under the















= −h0(xL) < 0
which shows that the strategy of the followers is independent from the one of the
leader. Since this holds also for xL = xF, that replicates the Nash equilibrium with
endogenous entry, in a SEFE any active follower adopts the same strategy as in the
corresponding Nash equilibrium.
At the entry stage, entry of at least one follower takes place for any xL < ¯ xL,
where ¯ xL is such that:
Π[x(h(¯ xL)),h(¯ xL)] = K
and the proﬁt of the leader is:
πL =
½
ΠL [xL,(n − 1)h(xF)] − Ki fx L < ¯ xL
ΠL(xL,0) − Ki f x L > ¯ xL
¾
Therefore, the optimal strategy is given by x∗
L that satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition:
ΠL
1 [x∗




if it is smaller than ¯ xL and such that:
ΠL {x∗
L,(n − 1)h(xF)} > ΠL (¯ xL,0)
Otherwise the global optimum is the corner solution ¯ xL. We will ﬁnally show that
in equilibrium xL >xalways. In case of corner solution, this is trivial. Consider
t h ec a s eo fa ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o nx∗
L as deﬁned above. Assume that x∗
L ≤ xF;t h e ni t
must be that X−F =( n−2)h(xF)+h(x∗
L) ≤ (n−1)h(xF)=X−L, which implies
Π(x∗
L,X −L) ≤ Π(x∗
L,X −F) from the assumption Π2 < 0. But the optimality of
xF and the free entry condition imply Π(x∗
L,X −F) < Π(xF,X −F)=K.F r o m
these inequalities it follows that Π(x∗
L,X −L) <K , which implies negative proﬁts for
the leader, contradicting the optimality of the interior solution. This implies that the
proﬁt function of the leader must have a global optimum larger than xF. Q.E.D.
27Proof of Proposition 2. The eﬀect of a change in the ﬁx e dc o s to nt h e


















The ﬁrst derivative has the opposite sign of Π12. The second has a ﬁrst negative
term (under the contraction condition when Π12 > 0) and a second ambiguous term.
It follows that d[X−F + h(xF)]/dK =[ Π11 − h0(xF)Π12]/Π11Π2h(xF). Totally

















Π11 +( n − 2)Π12h0(xF)+
h0(xL)






The result follows immediately after noticing from (8) that h0(xL)=ΠL
1/ΠL
2 . Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p3 : In a SEFE the number of ﬁrms is nS and each active follower
produces x. In a Cournot equilibrium with free entry, the number of ﬁrms is nC and








w h e r ew eu s e dt h ez e r op r o ﬁt condition p(nCx)x = c(x)+K. Under SEFE, the
number of ﬁrms nS satisﬁes the zero proﬁt condition:
p
£
xL +( nS − 1)x
¤
x = c(x)+K
which implies the same total production in the two cases xL +( nS − 1)x = nCx.








p(j)dj − p(nCx)nCx +
£
xL +( nS − 1)x
¤
p(nCx)
−(nS − 1)c(x) − c(xL) − nSK
= WC + xLp
£
xL +( nS − 1)x
¤
− c(xL) − K = WC + πL >W C
28which proves the claim. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prop 4: Adopt a generic cost function c(x) with c00(x) ≤ 0.I m a g i n e
an equilibrium without entry deterrence. The zero proﬁt condition, stated in the proof
of Prop. 3, determines the total production and, therefore, it determines also the
inverse demand at the level:
p[xC(nS − 1) + xL]=
K + c(x)
x
where x is always the equilibrium production of the followers, which corresponds to the
equilibrium production in the Cournot equilibrium with free entry. Then, the proﬁt
function of the leader becomes:










− c0(xL) > 0 ΠL00(xL)=−c00(xL) ≥ 0
since p(·) >c 0(x) >c 0(xL) for any xL >x . Accordingly, the leader always gains
from increasing its production all the way to the level at which entry is deterred. This
level satisﬁes the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o nf o rnS =2 ,t h a ti sp(x +¯ xL)=[ K + c(x)]/x.
Since the right hand side is also equal to p(nx) by the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o ni nt h e
Cournot equilibrium with free entry (see the proof of Prop. 3), it follows that the
entry deterrence strategy is exactly ¯ xL =( nC − 1)x. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prop 5: Total expenditure ¯ Y for the representative agent is given
by an exogenous part Y and the net proﬁts of the ﬁrms
Pn
i=1 πi,w h i c hi sz e r oi nt h e
Nash-Bertrand equilibrium with endogenous entry, but equal to the positive proﬁts
of the leader πL in the Stackelberg equilibrium with endogenous entry. The welfare
comparison derives from the calculation of indirect utilities (24) for the Logit model
and (25) for the Dixit-Stiglitz model in both cases. Labeling with W(¯ Y ) the indirect
utility in function of total expenditure ¯ Y , in the Logit case we have for both equilibria:









− N(1 + λc) − λK















Since they are both increasing in total expenditure, the utility of the representative
agent must be higher under Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Clearly (34) and (35) show that h0(xL) <h 0(xF)
and hence xL >x F ≡ x.N e tp r o ﬁts for the leader are:
πL =









29I m a g i n et h a tt h es o c i a lv a l u eo ft h ei n n o v a t i o ni sV ∗. Under Nash competition with




− nNx − nNK
Under Stackelberg competition with a leader investing xL and nS − 1 followers in-




h(xL)+( nS − 1)h(x)
¤
V ∗
r + h(xL)+( nS − 1)h(x)
− xL +( nS − 1)x − nSK
= WN +










Notice that the second term is πL > 0. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p7 : The analysis of the last stage is the same as before, and in
particular dxF/dxL =0 .N o w ,t h el e a d e r ’ sﬁrst order condition becomes:
ΠL
1 [xL,X −F + h(xF) − h(xL),y]=ΠL
2 [xL,X −F + h(xF) − h(xL),y]h0(xL)
which deﬁnes a continuous function xL = xL(y).I tf o l l o w st h a t :
x0
L(y) ∝ ΠL
13 [xL,X −F + h(xF) − h(xL),y]−ΠL
23 [xL,X −F + h(xF) − h(xL),y]h0(xL)
Clearly, when the condition in the proposition holds, we have x0
L(y) ≥ 0 and xL(y) ≥
xL(0) >x F from Prop. 1. Otherwise, since xL(0) >x F , continuity implies that
there is a neighborhood of xL(0) for y small enough where xL(0) >x L(y) >x F.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p8 : The analysis is similar to the basic one, but now total
diﬀerentiation provides dxF/dxL =0and dn/dxL = −h0(xL)/h0(xF).M o r e o v e r
we have:
dxF








where X−L =( n −m)h(xF)+( m −1)h(xL).T o t a l l yd i ﬀerentiating this condition
and using dn/dm it follows that dxL/dm =0 . The proﬁt of each leader is not aﬀected











which concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
30Part B: Generalized Stackelberg games.
In this section, we generalize the model of Stackelberg competition to the case of
positive spillovers and objective functions aﬀected separately by the number of agents,
and we discuss a few applications of the results. The aim is to show that the driving
factors leading to the aggressive behaviour of a leader facing endogenous entry keep
working in more general models than those studied in our main analysis, even if other
factors may work as well. Consider the following proﬁtf u n c t i o n :
πi = ˜ Π(xi,β i,n) − K (36)
with ˜ Πx ≷ 0 for x ≶ x(β), ˜ Πxx < 0, ˜ Πn ≤ 0 and no assumptions on ˜ Πβ and on
the cross derivatives. When the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, the traditional results
o nS t a c k e l b e r gc o m p e t i t i o nc a nb ee x t e n d e di nas t r a i g h t f o r w a r dw a y .W h e ne n t r yi s
endogenous, which requires regularity conditions that guarantee that d˜ Π/dn < 0,t h e
characterization of the SEFE is more complex. In the last stage, for a given leader’s












where ∆ ≡ ˜ Πβ ˜ Πxxh(x)+˜ Πn˜ Πxx +( n − 2)h0(x)[˜ Πn˜ Πxβ + ˜ Πxn˜ Πβ] > 0 is the
determinant of the equilibrium conditions in the last stage (proﬁt maximization ˜ Πx =
0, and free entry ˜ Π = K). The eﬀect of a change in the leader’s strategy on the
followers’strategy is ambiguous and the equilibrium condition for the leader’ strategy
can be derived as:
˜ ΠL
x =












The sign of the right hand side determines whether the leader will be aggressive
or not. Of course, for ˜ Πn = ˜ Πxn =0we are back to the basic case examined
in the text. In case of negative spillovers (˜ Πβh0(x) < 0) the second term on the
right is always negative and we can conclude that the leader is aggressive whenever
˜ Πxβ < −˜ Πβ ˜ Πxn/˜ Πn, while an accommodating behavior can only emerge in case of
strong strategic complementarities.
To exemplify the way to use this result, we will employ models of product dif-
ferentiation already adopted by Erkal and Piccinin (2007) in the study of mergers
in markets with endogenous entry. Let us consider a generalized model of product




















where Ci is consumption of good i and C0 is the numeraire. Goods are homogenous
when b =1and they are imperfectly substitutable otherwise. These preferences
31generate the system of inverse demand functions of Example 2. However, inverting
the system, we obtain the direct demand functions:
Di =
a − pi + b
1−b
P
j6=i (pj − pi)
1+b(n − 1)
It can be veriﬁed that the proﬁt function associated with this case is not nested in the
framework of the text, but it is nested in the general framework (36). Nevertheless,
it is well behaved and it is decreasing in the number of ﬁrms for given strategies.
Since prices are strategic complements, the Stackelberg equilibrium with an exogenous
number of ﬁrms is characterized by a higher price for the leader compared to the
followers. However, the SEFE is characterized by a lower price for the leader compared
t ot h ef o l l o w e r s .M o r e o v e r ,t h ep r i c eo ft h el e a d e ri sb e l o wt h ee q u i l i b r i u mp r i c ei nt h e
Nash equilibrium with free entry, while the price of the followers is above it and the
number of products is reduced.
24 In the long run, prices turn into strategic substitutes:
the reduction in the price of the leader induces the followers to increase their prices.





















with µ>0 representing the degree of substitutability between goods (with perfect























Of course, the associated proﬁt functions are not nested in our basic model because
they depend on the number of ﬁrms. However, they are nested in the generalized
version (36), which allows us to derive conclusions on the behaviour of market leaders
24Assume zero marginal costs. The optimality condition of the followers and the endogenous
entry condition imply the following equilibrium relation between the price of the followers pF
and the number of ﬁrms n:
pF =
 
F(1 − b)[1 + b(n − 1)]
[1 + b(n − 2)
A reduction in the price of the leader pL reduces entry and, according to this relation, it











where both n and pF depend on pL.S i n c e∂πL/∂nbpL=pF < 0, it is optimal for the leader to
reduce the number of ﬁrms compared to the Nash equilibrium with free entry.
32even if we cannot explicitly solve for the equilibria with endogenous entry. Under








where the strategic variable is output xi and βi =
P
j6=i xj.N o t i c e t h a t˜ Πβ < 0,
˜ Πn < 0, ˜ Πxβ < 0 and ˜ Πxn < 0,h e n c eb o t ht e r m so nt h eright hand side of (38)
are negative: this implies that a market leader facing endogenous entry will always
be aggressive, that is produce more than each follower. This should not surprising,
since according to (37), an increase in the production of the leader has now a negative
impact on both the number of followers and on their production as well.











w h e r et h es t r a t e g i cv a r i a b l ei st h ep r i c epi and βi =
P
j6=i pj ( n o t i c et h a tw ed i d
not use the transformation of the strategic variable employed in the main text for
c o m p e t i t i o ni np r i c e s ) . W en o wh a v e˜ Πβ > 0, ˜ Πn < 0, ˜ Πxβ > 0 and ˜ Πxn < 0.
This implies that, according to (37), an increase in the price of the leader increases
the price of the followers (strategic complementarity in action), but it also promotes
entry: the former eﬀect increases the proﬁts of the leader, the latter reduces them.
A sac o n s e q u e n c e ,o nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 3 8 )t h eﬁr s tt e r mi sn e g a t i v ea n dt h e
second one can be positive. In this case, the leader facing endogenous entry would
reduce its price and the followers would reduce their prices as well (prices are strategic
complements in both the short and long run). As a consequence the number of varieties
provided in the market would decrease. Nevertheless, consumer surplus would strictly
increase because of the generalized reduction in prices.
25
A ﬁnal application of the generalized model can be obtained reinterpreting a simple
model with heterogenous ﬁrms. Imagine that the proﬁtf u n c t i o nf o rﬁrm i is πi =
A(i)Π(xi,β i) − F,w h e r eA(i) is a parameter of proﬁtability (or a multiplicative
shock to proﬁtability) which diﬀers across ﬁrms and decreases in the ordering of entry
of the ﬁrms, which is indexed by i. Notice that the optimality condition for each
follower, Π1(x,β)=0 , is independent from the speciﬁc value of A,w h i l ee n t r y
occurs until the nth ﬁrm obtains zero proﬁts, that is A(n)Π(x,β)=K. Then,
the model is isomorphic to the generalized model with proﬁtf u n c t i o n˜ Π(xi,β i,n)=
A(n)Π(xi,β i), and one can verify that the leader is not necessarily aggressive. In
particular we now have dx/dxL ≷ 0 if Π12 ≷ 0: when SS holds the aggressiveness
of the leader is strengthened, while under SC, this aggressiveness is dampened and
it may even be reversed. Intuitively, the leader takes in consideration that a more
aggressive strategy will reduce entry as usual, but such a change will also increase the
proﬁtability of the marginal ﬁrm, which changes the strategic interaction between the
followers.
25These result derive from joint work with Nisvan Erkal and Daniel Piccinin.
33Part C: Multiple strategies
Now, I will outline how a weaker version of the result on aggressive leaders gener-
alizes when ﬁrms choose multiple strategic variables. Imagine that each ﬁrm chooses a
vector of K ≥ 1 strategic variables xi =[ xi1,x i2,...,xiJ] ∈ R
J
+, and its well behaved









with h : R
J
+ → R+ diﬀerentiable and increasing in all its arguments. Examples are
models of multimarket competition, competition in quality and price, patent races
with multiple investments and so on. Clearly these are very important cases in real
markets. Results on the behaviour of leaders in similar markets with an exogenous
number of ﬁrms are complicated and ambiguous since they depend on all the possible
cross derivatives and hence on many speciﬁc properties of the markets. Nevertheless,
under free entry, a weaker version of our result still holds.
Deﬁne ﬁrm i on average more aggressive than ﬁrm k if h(xi) >h (xk). Then,
in equilibrium we have a vector x for the followers which is independent from the










≤ 0 for all j
This does not imply that the leader is more aggressive in all strategies, but that
is always more aggressive in some strategies. Moreover, it follows that a SEFE with
multiple strategic variables always implies that the leader is on average more aggressive
than each follower. To prove this, denote with xi =[ xi1,x i2,...,xiJ] the strategies of
a ﬁrm i. Assume again that a symmetric equilibrium in the strategies of the followers
exist. The system of J +1equilibrium conditions for the second stage:
∂Π[xF,(n − 2)h(xF)+h(xL)]
∂xFj
=0 f o rj =1 ,2,..,J
Π[xF,(n − 2)h(xF)+h(xL)] = K
pins down the vector xF and X−F =( n−2)h(xF)+h(xL). Consequently the proﬁt
of the leader is:
πL = ΠL [xL,(n − 1)h(xF)] − K = ΠL [xL,X −F + h(xF) − h(xL)] − K









where clearly X−L =( n − 1)h(xF). Imagine that there is such an interior equi-
librium with h(xL) ≤ h(xF). T h e ni tm u s tb et h a tX−F ≤ X−L, which implies
34Π(xL,X −L) ≤ Π(xL,X −L) from the assumption Π2 < 0. But the optimality of
xF and the free entry condition imply Π(xL,X −L) < Π(xF,X −F)=K,h e n c e
Π(xL,X −L) <K , which contradicts the optimality of the interior solution. This
implies that h(xL) >h (xF).
To see how to use this result, let us extend our basic model of price competition
with the choice of a second strategy, the quality of the product. In such a model with
vertical diﬀerentiation, each ﬁrm can oﬀer a product of quality qi at a price pi,a n d
the marginal cost for this quality level, c(qi), is increasing and convex in quality. Let
us assume that consumers allocate their demand comparing the quality/price ratios













[pi − c(qi)] − K
























where h(θj,q j)=g(1/θi). We cannot say whether the leader will oﬀer a good
with both a lower price and a higher quality, but only that the good of the leader
will be better than the goods oﬀered by the followers at least in one of these two
dimensions. Nevertheless, we can also say that the leader will be more aggressive than
the followers on average, which means, according to our deﬁnition, that h(θL,q L) >
h(θ,q). But this implies g(1/θL) >g (1/θ) or, using the fact that g is a decreasing
function, that θL >θ . We can then conclude that the leader will supply a good with
a better quality/price ratio than each other follower. Of course, more complex forms
of multidimensional models remain to be studied.
35